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It has been over half a century since the landmark Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was adopted, for the first
time unifying international drug policy under a single treaty aimed at limiting use, manufacture, trade, possession,
and trafficking of opiates, cannabis, and other narcotics. Since then, other international drug policy measures have
been adopted, largely emphasizing enforcement-based approaches to reducing drug supply and use. Recently, in
response to concerns that the historic focus on criminalization and enforcement has had limited effectiveness,
international drug policies have begun to undergo a paradigm shift as countries seek to enact their own reforms to
partially depenalize or deregulate personal drug use and possession. This includes Mexico, which in 2009 enacted
national drug policy reform partially decriminalizing possession of small quantities of narcotics for personal consumption
while also requiring drug treatment for repeat offenders. As countries move forward with their own reform models,
critical assessment of their legal compatibility and effectiveness is necessary. In this commentary we conduct a critical
assessment of the compatibility of Mexico’s reform policy to the international drug policy regime and describe its role in
the current evolving drug policy environment. We argue that Mexico’s reform is consistent with flexibilities allowed
under international drug treaty instruments and related commentaries. We also advocate that drug policy reforms and
future governance efforts should be based on empirical evidence, emphasize harm reduction practices, and integrate
evidence-based evaluation and implementation of drug reform measures.
Keywords: International drug policy, Single convention, Harm reduction, Mexico drug policy, Drug policy reform,
UN office of drugs and crime, Global healthCommentary
Background
It has been over half a century since the landmark, as
amended by the 1972 Protocol amending the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961, was adopted (Single
Convention), for the first time unifying international drug
policy under a single treaty designed to limit the use,
manufacture, trade, possession, and trafficking of opiates,
cannabis, and other narcotic and similar drugs [1]. Since
then, other international drug policy instruments have
also been adopted, including the 1971 Convention on
Psychotropic Substances (CPS) and the 1988 Convention
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic and Psychotropic Sub-
stances (Illicit Traffic Convention), aimed at limiting use* Correspondence: tmackey@ucsd.edu
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unless otherwise stated.of narcotic and psychotropic drugs exclusively for medical
and scientific purposes while also criminalizing their
unauthorized production and trade [1,2].
More than 50 years later, the success of these widely
adopted instruments is in question. An epidemic of
global drug use continues, with an estimated 149–271
million illicit drug users reported in 2009 and an overall
increase in incarceration for drug-related offenses [3-5].
Critically, drug dependence and injection drug use and
its related harms are associated with overdose mortality,
drug dependence, and the transmission of HIV and
hepatitis B and C viruses [5-7]. As such, the effectiveness
of enforcement-based approaches to reducing drug sup-
ply and limiting drug use which have been emphasized
by a range of United Nations drug control bodies or
organs—including the United Nations Office of Drugs
and Crime (UNODC), The Commission on Narcotic
Drugs (CND), and the International Narcotics Board
(INCB)—has been questioned, while concerns exist thatl Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
Mackey et al. Harm Reduction Journal 2014, 11:31 Page 2 of 7
http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/11/1/31a criminalization-based approach exacerbates negative
health consequences for people who use drugs [1,2,8,9].
At the same time, support for the international drug con-
trol governance regime and the policy approaches codified
by these entities and instruments appears to be waning,
with at least 30 countries enacting their own alternative ap-
proaches through domestic drug policy reform [10]. These
include policies of complete and partial deregulation/
decriminalization, or decisions by national governments to
withdraw from or simply cease to enforce treaty obligations
prohibiting personal use and possession of drugs [8,11].
Despite these attempts at policy experimentation, there is
currently lack of sufficient empirical evidence regarding
the effectiveness of these reform measures or the impact of
their intended and unintended consequences. Reform de-
velopments also coincide with ongoing concerns regarding
the impact of the international drug conventions on limit-
ing access to pain management medication, use and regu-
lation of cannabis, and a growing evidence base suggesting
that less punitive approaches like harm reduction modal-
ities are effective in mitigating negative health conse-
quences of drug abuse [2,8,11-17].
One country now at the center of this international
debate is Mexico, which in 2009 adopted controversial
drug policy reform. Mexico has borne a disproportionate
burden of drug-related harms, including an epidemic of
drug cartel-initiated violence, a burgeoning prison popu-
lation, and mounting syndemics related to substance use
and infectious diseases [18-20]. Mexico’s law decriminal-
izes possession of small quantities of narcotics, requires
drug treatment for repeat offenders, and shifts responsi-
bility of implementation and legal prosecution from the
federal to state level [21,22]. In this piece, we critically
examine Mexico’s drug reform and its compatibility to
the international drug policy governance regime, which
we adopt to define as the system of formal institutions,
legal instruments, norms, and processes that govern glo-
bal drug control [23]. We argue that the evaluation and
generation of empirical data to appropriately assess the
impact of this reform is critical, given the evidence that
drug-related harms remain pervasive in Mexico and
given the potential that this reform may serve to inform
future developments in drug policy reform in other
settings [18,19].
The international drug policy regime
Flexibilities and ambiguities
With 184 UN member states having signed on to the
Single Convention, this treaty has near unanimous adop-
tion internationally. However, it is not self-executing,
meaning that it requires member states to translate and
implement treaty-bound obligations through their own
national legislation [1,11]. Additionally, the Single Con-
vention also includes flexibilities due to the confusioncreated by a lack of definitive treaty terms [1,11]. This
includes ambiguity regarding the specific definition of
“medical and scientific” purposes [1,11].
In response, there have been several attempts to clarify
whether the Single Convention creates an affirmative
obligation for states to penalize the possession of drugs
for personal consumption. Specifically, Article 36 gener-
ally requires states to penalize drug-related offenses, yet
it is unclear if the term “possession” contained in this
clause refers solely to trafficking of drugs or also encom-
passes personal consumption/possession, opening up the
possibility for policy variation [1,24]. The Commentary
to the Single Convention notes that Article 36 may be
interpreted differently by national governments, and if
they choose to impose penalties, such penalties need not
constitute a “serious offense” and can instead take the
form of administrative penalties or fines [1]. In 1977, the
UNODC provided a more definitive response to this
question, explaining that wholesale legalization of drugs
for non-scientific and non-medical purposes was prohib-
ited and unacceptable but also clarifying that countries are
under no obligation to impose penal sanctions against
unauthorized personal consumption and possession [25].
Similar to the Single Convention, the CPS and Illicit
Traffic Convention are not self-executing treaties and
face similar issues regarding interpretation and flexibil-
ities [11]. CPS Article 22 provides qualifiers that limit
the scope of its obligations to a country’s constitutional
limitations and domestic law and aligns with flexibilities
in the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention
allowing countries to substitute penal offenses against
substance abusers with “treatment, education, after-care,
rehabilitation and social reintegration”.
Article 3 of The Illicit Trade Convention takes a more
direct stance to addressing personal possession by spe-
cifically calling for the criminalization of possession,
purchase, or cultivation for personal consumption under
domestic law but also contains similar language limiting
treaty obligations to a country’s constitutional principles
or “basic concepts of its legal system”, a flexibility that
could be broadly interpreted. Further, it remains unclear
if Article 3 is binding on states as it defaults back to obli-
gations of the Single Convention and CPS that do not
appear to require penalization.
Overall, commentators such as Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma
have noted that decriminalization of possession, purchase,
and cultivation for personal use, as well as provisioning of
harm reduction services, likely operates within the confines
of the international drug control regime [26]. In contrast,
policies that create legally regulated markets for non-
medical use of scheduled drugs are clearly prohibited by
the conventions [26]. Additionally, they note that legal
conflict, inconsistencies, and ambiguities continue to exist,
supporting further drug policy experimentation [26].
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Further complicating treaty interpretations are practical
considerations regarding the level of enforceability of the
international drug control policy regime. For example,
even if a country violates its treaty-bound obligations,
drug control bodies erected under the conventions, such
as the INCB—the control organ charged with interpret-
ation, monitoring, and implementation of the conven-
tions—have few options with which to confront
offending countries [11]. While the treaties allow the INCB
Board to reduce a member state’s opium export quotas in
response to illicit production or diversion or recommending
the issuance of export or import bans against violating
countries, these are seldom exercised [11].
The Single Convention’s prohibition of cannabis (embed-
ded in Schedules I and IV of the Convention) has also been
challenged or ignored by several jurisdictions [27]. Canna-
bis is perhaps the most high-profile drug subject to
legalization, decriminalization, and deregulation efforts at
both the national and state levels and has thereby engen-
dered ongoing debate about its reclassification/reschedul-
ing within the treaties via amendment or denunciation of
the Single Convention [8,27]. Specifically, the INCB has
formally stated that Uruguay’s national law to legalize and
regulate cultivation and sale of cannabis (currently being
implemented) is in direct violation of the Single Conven-
tion [28,29]. Similarly, jurisdictions technically not direct
parties to the Convention, such as U.S. states of Colorado
and Washington, have voted to pass laws to legalize, regu-
late, and tax cannabis, which the INCB also states is in
breach of United States’ commitments under the Single
Convention [26,30].
Countries have also taken more direct action by challen-
ging the international drug treaties through re-accession
when faced with incompatible domestic policies that
clearly conflict with the Single Convention. In 2012,
Bolivia took the unprecedented action of formally with-
drawing as a party to the treaty in order to uphold the
country’s long-standing tradition of coca leaf chewing, a
practice now banned by the Single Convention [11,31].
Bolivia formally amended its own Constitution to allow its
government to challenge the ban, which resulted in a for-
mal request with the CND to amend the convention that
ultimately failed due to certain member state objections
[11]. Bolivia’s withdrawal was then followed with a request
to re-accede to the Convention with reservations (allowed
by the treaty) against the ban to allow coca leaf and its
traditional uses [11]. Bolivia’s withdrawal and re-accession
entered into force on February 2013, when only 15 coun-
tries (one-third required) objected to Bolivia’s reservation,
then permitted it to be accepted [31].
In contrast to these policy approaches, Mexico’s recent
drug policy reform represents an interesting balance
between complying with the general legal obligations ofthese treaties while also developing targeted policy inter-
ventions that are compatible with flexibilities discussed.
Ley de narcomenudeo: Mexico’s drug policy reform
Description of the law and controversy
In August 2009, Mexico enacted a drug policy reform
known as the Small-Scale Drug Law (“ley de narcomenu-
deo”) amending Article 478 of the country’s Federal General
Health Law [18,20-22,32]. The reform follows earlier
amendments to the Federal Criminal Code in 1994 that
decriminalized certain quantities of narcotics strictly for
personal consumption. The new reform also expanded pre-
vious legal amendments by eliminating criminal penalties
for personal possession of small, specified amounts of
cocaine (0.5 g), heroin (50 mg), LSD (0.015 mg), metham-
phetamine (40 mg), and marijuana (5 g) (see Table 1), as a
response to the increased substance use, drug-related
violence, and crime that have rapidly escalated in Mexico
over the past decade [18,20,21,33]. The law also specifies
that following apprehension by police, individuals in
possession of sub-threshold amounts will receive a police
record stating that they have received “no penal action” and
then will be released [18,20]. However, in the event an indi-
vidual is apprehended a third time, they will be required to
enter mandatory drug treatment, though penalties for non-
compliance are not specified.
The ley de narcomenudeo received both support and
criticism for its new approach to domestic drug control
including comments from the INCB Board in 2009 that
state-based decriminalization policies posed a threat to
the coherence of the international drug control regime
[34]. Specifically, proponents of the law argued that it
would allow law enforcement to focus on the illicit criminal
trade and trafficking of drugs, which is a core principle of
the Single Convention and other drug control treaties
[18,20,32]. In addition, the mechanism requiring mandatory
drug treatment for repeat offenders has been lauded for re-
quiring the scale-up of much-needed opioid substitution
programs [32]. However, opponents have countered that
the reform will increase the availability of illicit drugs,
encourage use, could lead to more police encounters for
drug users, and potentially exacerbate risky drug-related
behaviors [18,22,35]. In addition, there are concerns regard-
ing Mexico’s capacity to adequately finance and expand ac-
cess for drug dependence treatment, particularly opioid
substitution treatment ostensibly contemplated by the law,
and whether the country can ensure the quality and appro-
priateness of addiction treatment while preventing the
mistreatment and abuse of drug users in treatment
programs [18,20].
Compatibility with the international drug control regime
Despite its controversy, Mexico’s drug policy reform is
innovative in many ways. First, it partially deregulates a
Table 1 Drugs covered under ley de narcomenudeo
Drug Applicable UNODC treaty Mexico possession limit
Opium Single convention (Schedule I) 2 g
Heroin Single convention (Schedule I) 50 mg
Marijuana Single convention (Schedule I) 5 g
Cocaine Single convention (Schedule I) 500 mg
LSD Convention on psychotropic substances (schedule I) 0.015 mg
MDMA Convention on psychotropic substances (schedule I) 40 mg (powder, granulate, crystal)
200 mg (one unit tablet or caplet)
MDA Convention on psychotropic substances (schedule I) 40 mg (powder, granulate, crystal)
200 mg (one unit tablet or caplet)
Methamphetamine Convention on psychotropic substances (schedule II) 40 mg (powder, granulate, crystal)
200 mg (one unit tablet or caplet)
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multiple drug treaty instruments including the Single
Convention and the CPS (see Table 1). It deviates from
other drug reform measures that have decriminalized
the possession of a single drug (e.g., cannabis in
Uruguay) or of all illicit drugs (e.g., Portugal decriminal-
izes purchase, possession, and consumption for 10-day
personal supply) [13,36,37]. Further, though the law does
not criminalize individual possession of specified low-
threshold amounts on the first or second apprehension,
offenders nevertheless receive an administrative record,
and a third apprehension triggers mandatory diversion
that, in principle, can triage drug-dependent individuals
to appropriate treatment [20]. In this sense, the law does
not enact an approach of total prohibition nor does it com-
pletely decriminalize or legalize personal use and posses-
sion, as treatment paired with the possibility of treatment/
sanctions is the pathway provided to repeat offenders [8,38].
While Mexico is a party to all of these international
treaties, only lodging limited reservations, the ley de nar-
comenudeo appears to fall within the range of flexibility
permitted under the Single Convention, CPS, and Illicit
Traffic Convention (see Table 2). Specifically, Mexico’s
partial depenalization law with its variation of a “three





Single convention on narcotic
drugs (1961)
184 8 August 1975
Convention on psychotropic
substances (1971)
183 16 August 1976
UN convention against illicit traffic in




aAccession.under Article 36 of the amended Single Convention,
Article 22 of CPS, and related treaty commentaries.
Beyond its compatibility with the existing international
drug legal regime, we contend that the success of Mexico’s
drug policy reform relies on a number of key develop-
ments. These include the successful implementation of a
large-scale and effective addiction treatment system; the
meaningful involvement and training of law enforcement
and the judiciary in triaging individuals to treatment,
monitoring, and evaluation; and improved governance to
address corruption and ensure ethical enforcement/treat-
ment [39]. This specifically includes assessment of the
implementation of the reform law by local jurisdictions
(given that the implementation of ley de narcomenudeo is
left up to the state and local governments), and periodic
re-evaluation of the law and its requirements.
Within this context, it may be necessary to reassess some
aspects of the drug policy reform to ensure its effectiveness.
For example, it may be necessary to revise the law’s
personal drug possession thresholds, as they do not appear
to be scientifically based and are of low enough quantities
that they could increase the likelihood of police extortion
or misclassification of traffickers [40]. Further, procedural
issues requiring police to take confiscated drugs to author-
ities for weighing against threshold amounts introduceMexico’s date of
ratification
Mexico’s adherence status
27 April 1977 No reservations
20 February 1975a Indigenous ethic group traditional use
of wild plants containing psychotropic
substances in Schedule I
11 April 1990 Reservation against USA unilateral claim
to justification for denying legal assistance
to a State that requests it
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that should be addressed.
In addition, adequate scale-up of accessible and afford-
able drug treatment, such as the expansion of methadone
maintenance treatment (MMT) under the Consejo Nacio-
nal contra las Adicciones federal drug control program in
Mexico, will be necessary to provide capacity for an influx
of cases of opioid-dependent individuals [32]. However,
continuing barriers in scaling up MMT, low levels of
MMT enrollment possibly influenced by discretionary
policing practices, and continued nationwide arrests of in-
dividuals for drug possession even after passage of the law
indicate that these challenges have yet to be adequately
addressed [20,39]. Some areas of the country, such as the
state of Baja California with the highest number of
mandatory drug treatment referrals, appear to be making
progress, although it is slower than anticipated [39].
Reform: the need for evidence-based policymaking and
implementation science
The international drug control regime is undergoing a
paradigm shift. Nevertheless, ambiguity and conflict with
institutions such as the INCB remain regarding the
extent of the flexibilities allowed by the international
drug treaties in relation to these state-based measures
[1,11,24,34]. Beyond national efforts to reform drug pol-
icy, signs of change are also evident at the international
level, with calls for the redirection of anti-drug efforts
towards evidence-based models of harm reduction
reified by the Vienna Declaration and by the Harm
Reduction Coalition and Open Society Foundations
[8,41,42]. A working group of the UNODC also recently
announced groundbreaking recommendations explicitly
stating that criminal sanctions are not beneficial for
addressing drug dependence [43].Table 3 Proposed research priority areas for drug reform
Theme Description
Implementation science Development of implementation scie
integration of research findings and
dissemination and incorporation of r
reform practices, including the ley de
Comparative policy analysis Detailed exploration of the associatio
cross-comparisons of multiple jurisdi
Development of indicators Establish a set of effectiveness indica
composition of illicit drug markets an
outcomes that measure drug-related
who inject drugs, the incidence of n
International development on
evidence-based policy mechanisms
Based on approaches above, cooper
appropriate evidence-based policy m
Internationally agreed upon best pra
also be pursued along with avenues
Multidisciplinary/multi-sector research
partnerships
Key for development of formalized p
departments, law enforcement offici
and evaluate data to guide future ev
reduction, and ensure human rightsAs an increasing number of countries, such as Mexico,
enact alternatives to enforcement-based approaches to
drug use, international drug control organizations should
recognize the opportunities of existing treaty flexibilities
for policy experimentation and the need to better assess
the implementation, effectiveness, compatibility, and
impact of these reform measures on a range of health,
economic, and societal outcomes. This should include
meaningful support, funding, and prioritization of public
health, substance abuse, and policy/legal research examin-
ing whether reform measures are properly implemented
and have their desired effect of reducing substance abuse-
related health risks while also enabling law enforcement
to focus on the criminal element of the drug trade
[2,7,8,41]. Some suggested research priority areas which
are outlined in Table 3.
Inevitably, some may question whether new drug pol-
icy reform models should be pursued by individual
countries in the absence of robust empirical data and
policy evaluation that could support their effectiveness
and address implementation challenges. However,
natural-drug policy experiments have been ongoing for
some time, as is the case in Portugal, Switzerland, and
the Netherlands, with data on the effectiveness and how
to improve these policy alternatives still insufficient but
nevertheless emerging [37,40]. Hence, it is key for local,
national, and international stakeholders to examine
evidence emanating from drug policy reform measures
that operate both within the confines/limitations of inter-
national drug control law and those reform measures that
go beyond these flexibilities. This is necessary to deter-
mine what elements of reform and implementation are
successful and consistent with public health and harm re-
duction practices as well as identifying those that pose un-
intended risks [37,40].nce approaches, defined as the “study of methods to promote the
evidence into healthcare policy and practice” [44], to provide
esearch about the successes and challenges of varying drug policy
narcomenudeo.
n between decriminalization policies and reductions in drug use using
ctions and different reform strategies [45].
tors that go beyond conventional metrics regarding the size and
d prevalence of use. Instead, such metrics should incorporate a range of
harms such as the transmission of blood-borne diseases among people
on-fatal and fatal overdoses, and emergency room mentions of drugs [9].
ation on building international consensus and development of culturally
echanisms that are compatible/align with existing treaty flexibilities.
ctices guidelines for implementation of these policy measures should
for technical assistance [41].
artnerships between local, national, and international public health
als, and policymakers to work closely with impartial experts to collect
idence-based approaches to address drug abuse, promote harm
protection.
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put increasing pressure on the international drug policy
community to diligently evaluate emerging models and
their impact on indicators of drug-related harm. This
can be accomplished by recognizing the urgent need for
research to inform future evidence policy-making efforts
at the upcoming UN General Assembly Special Session
(UNGASS) on Drugs scheduled for 2016 [46]. The
UNGASS on Drugs will provide Member States the
opportunity to reassess progress towards the “UNODC
Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International
Cooperation Towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy
to Counter the World Drug Problem” and has been
highlighted by Latin American leaders as a forum for
debate on alternative approaches to the international drug
control regime [46].
Conclusion
The success or failure of Mexico’s drug policy reform
will have broader implications for the evolution of global
drug policy reform and its relationship with the inter-
national drug control system. Others have called for
revisiting, amending, developing new instruments, or
withdrawing from international drug policy treaties [1,8].
In this commentary, however, we argue that existing
flexibilities allow for important policy experimentation
that needs to be critically researched and evaluated to
inform effectiveness and proper implementation. As the
momentum for innovative drug policy reform grows, the
international drug control regime should modernize by
building evidence-based approaches to guide future efforts
while also promoting harm reduction and protection of
human rights. An international commitment to determine
whether these policy experiments are successful is there-
fore urgently needed in order to provide policymakers
across the globe with a set of tools by which to design
evidence-based approaches to meaningfully address on-
going drug use, addiction, and its negative health impacts.
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